To build up coherence between sentences (comprehend discourse), we must draw inferences, i.e. activate and integrate information that is not actually stated. We used event-related fMRI to determine the localization and extent of brain activity mediating causal inferencing across short, three-sentence scenarios. Participants read and made causal coherence judgments to sentences that were highly causally related, intermediately related or unrelated to their preceding two-sentence contexts. The highly related and intermediately related scenarios were matched in terms of semantic similarities between their individual component words. A pre-rating study established that causal inferences were generated to the intermediately related but not to the highly related or unrelated scenarios. In the scanner, sentences that were intermediately related (relative to highly related or unrelated) to their preceding contexts were associated with longer judgment reaction times and sustained increases in hemodynamic activity within left lateral temporal/inferior parietal/prefrontal cortices, the right inferior prefrontal gyrus and bilateral superior medial prefrontal cortices. In contrast, sentences that were unrelated (relative to highly related) to their preceding contexts were associated with only transient increases in activity (at, but not after, the peak of the hemodynamic response) within the right lateral temporal cortex and the right inferior prefrontal gyrus. These data suggest that, to make sense of discourse, we activate a large bilateral cortical network in response to what is not explicitly stated. We suggest that this network reflects the activation, retrieval and integration of information from long-term semantic memory into incoming discourse structure during causal inferencing.

The aim of this study was to gain further insights into how the brain distinguishes between meaning and syntax during language comprehension. Participants read and made plausibility judgments on sentences that were plausible, morphosyntactically anomalous, or pragmatically anomalous. In an event-related potential (ERP) experiment, morphosyntactic and pragmatic violations elicited significant P600 and N400 effects, respectively, replicating previous ERP studies that have established qualitative differences in processing conceptually and syntactic anomalies. Our main focus was a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study in which the same subjects read the same sentences presented in the same pseudorandomized sequence while performing the same task as in the ERP experiment. Rapid-presentation event-related fMRI methods allowed us to estimate the hemodynamic response at successive temporal windows as the sentences unfolded word by word, without assumptions about the shape of the underlying response function. Relative to nonviolated sentences, the pragmatic anomalies were associated with an increased hemodynamic response in left temporal and inferior frontal regions and a decreased response in the right medial parietal cortex. Relative to nonviolated sentences, the morphosyntactic anomalies were associated with an increased response in bilateral medial and lateral parietal regions and a decreased response in left temporal and inferior frontal regions. Thus, overlapping neural networks were modulated in opposite directions to the two types of anomaly. These fMRI findings document both qualitative and quantitative differences in how the brain distinguishes between these two types of anomalies. This suggests that morphosyntactic and pragmatic information can be processed in different ways but by the same neural systems.

Extracting meaning from speech requires the use of pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic information. A central question is: Does the processing of these different types of linguistic information have common or distinct neuroanatomical substrates? We addressed this issue using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure neural activity when subjects listened to spoken normal sentences contrasted with sentences that had either (A) pragmatical, (B) semantic (selection restriction), or (C) syntactic (subcategorical) violations sentences. All three contrasts revealed robust activation of the left-inferior-temporal/fusiform gyrus. Activity in this area was also observed in a combined analysis of all three experiments, suggesting that it was modulated by all three types of linguistic violation. Planned statistical comparisons between the three experiments revealed (1) a greater difference between conditions in activation of the left-superior-temporal gyrus for the pragmatic experiment than the semantic/syntactic experiments; (2) a greater difference between conditions in activation of the right-superior and middle-temporal gyrus in the semantic experiment than in the syntactic experiment; and (3) no regions activated to a greater degree in the syntactic experiment than in the semantic experiment. These data show that, while left- and right-superior-temporal regions may be differentially involved in processing pragmatic and lexico-semantic information within sentences, the left-inferior-temporal/fusiform gyrus is involved in processing all three types of linguistic information. We suggest that this region may play a key role in using pragmatic, semantic (selection restriction), and subcategorical information to construct a higher representation of meaning of sentences.